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Community Development And Politics In Konya
Malcolm Hall is
Kenyan Bureaucrats have tended to take the view that the invol­
vement of politicians in community development work has been largely 
negative in its results. Community Development workers, Development 
Planners and other civil servants working in sectoral ministries 
such as Education and Health have shared this attitude* Their 
criticisms of politicians have covered a number of points. For 
example, frequent comments have been made about the alleged, corrupt 
practices of politicians involved in self-help projects... Politicians
have also been accused of recklessly encouraging communities to 
embark on ambitious projects without thorough planning, of making 
promises which later cannot be fulfilled and of using self-help 
for their own political ends without taking into account the real 
needs of the communities in question. The result has been a number 
of over—ambitious projects which are subsequently abandoned or never 
become operational ( e.g. a Health Centre which is built but not used 
because°^the inability of the Ministry of Health to provide adequate 
staff and equipment). There is no doubt that self-help has been a 
significant source of tension between administrators and politicians,
i
In this paper, we wish to examine in some detail the political 
aspects of self-help in Kenya. A lot of work on Community Dcvclopnei>t( CD), 
-especially the ''textbooks", neglect this dimension almost entirely. 
However, the connections between CD and politics are close:; as such, 
there is something to be said for spelling them out. Our assumptions 
differ somewhat to the. conventional wdsdom of the bureaucrats to 
whom we have just referred. Certainly, it seems wrong to assume 
that the role of politicians has been a completely negative one.
The issue is more complex than that. It will he argued that self-help 
has also often performed important functions for the political system
aIn Kenya, the terms "Community Develops nit", "Self-help" and "harambce" 
are synonomous.
)  '
1
I
1as a whole. To'be more specific, it has significantly contributed, 
to filling the vacuum crea ed by the inadequacy of the ruling party, 
KJlNU, as an agency of grass roots mobilisation of rural communities 
in Kenya. This weakness of KAITT7 is far from being unique in Africa.
As Aris'tido Zolberg has pointed out, ruling parties in most west 
African countries have shown similar tendencies.
KAihJ and rural development.
Clearly a development strategy involving a theoretically high
level of popular participation c; n include -an important role for
political parties. For example, in Tanzania, since the Arusha
declaration of 19^7j considerable emphasis has been placed on this
issue by the national leadership. A similar point can he made
with regard to Zambia where President Kaunda has frequently called
upon United National Independence. Party (U, 17.1, P.) Members to play
2an ac Give role in the implementatdon of development projects.
Although these leaders may not always be specific about what this 
entails, a number of organisational requirements for such a role 
soer. to be involved. First, there needs to be a regular, subscribed, 
membership. Secondly, this membership needs to be organised down 
to quite a low ( or local) administrative level (e.g. the village, the 
sub-location or the ” parish”). Thirdly, there needs to be some 
means by which members can make known their views on policy matters 
to the leadership, both through regular national conferences and 
through the passing of resolutions at the local level. Fourthly, 
an institutional means has to he found for regularly clarifying, 
and (possibly) adjusting party . policy. Fifthly, the relationship 
between the party on the one hand and the civil service, cabinet 
and parliament on the other needs carefully spelling out.
In both examples cited above, Tanzania and Zambia, there may -
be grounds for questioning the organisational .effectiveness of the 
ruling parties but both countries have made greater attempts than 
Kenya. KAiTU has thus far failed to pi y any meaningful role in 
development polioy, and has from time to time Some in for criticism 
as a result. '1 Some of these criticisms have come from K. A. N.U, 
members themselves. For example, in 1968 a KlA.N.U, MP*s private
!
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rmotion in the National Assembly moved that 3 -
nIn view of the fact that our Government is 
a political one and that the party organisation 
and African Socialism have been deliberately neglected 
and all Government powers delegated to civil servants$ 
this house urges the Government to organise the party 
in such a way that the party is given priority in all 
matters which will enhance party democracy and African 
Social.ism on which principles our state was founded.
The debate revealed some confusion on the part of the critics 
as to what was wrong and what needed to be done but there was clarity 
on some points, Mr, Mbogoh (Bnbu forth), the mover of this motion, 
noted that the party had failed to hold annual elections and did 
not hold annual conferences. He complained bitterly that M.Ps and 
District Chairmen of KANU were .just the "rejects of society" and 
warned that these weaknesses considerably enhanced the dangers of 
military intervention. Government reaction to this motion was to 
agree to support a somewhat diluted versions
"In view of the fact that KANU is the ruling party
this House urges the. Government to recognise the
party in such a way that the party is given priority
in all matters which will enhance party democracy
and African Socialism on which principles our state 
6was founded"
Criticism continued into the 1 9 7 0*3, perhaps becoming more 
strrident with the passage of time, Marly in 1 9 7 5? the outspoken 
M.P, from Western Province, Mr,- Shikuku stated in the National 
Assembly that " KANU does not function and is in fact . dead,
Later that year he was detained, apparently for his outspoken 
insistence on the need to revitali KA.ITU, Another critism at around 
the same time came from Mr, L- ir. Chairman of KANU Mombasa branch; 
who was reported as arguing tl at " m  immediate reorganisation of the 
ruling party — KANTJ was vital to development of this country 
and the sooner it was carried out the better,
, e t«/4-
- 4 -
But, as of 1977? attempts to revive the party had Been abortive .and 
the prospects .for any new initiatives did not appear to be bright.
In essence, KANTJ does not seem likely to provide a vehicle for 
promoting participation of the country’s population in rural development 
efforts.
Self-Help and Kenya Politics
The weakness of KAMJ docs not mean that no vehicle for parti­
cipation exists. In fact, the self-help movement has gone a long 
way towards filling this gap. The movement has provided a network 
of relationships in the midst of which politicians have vied for 
support with relative freedom. It is clear, for example, that many 
of the I'l.Ps who have been elected since independence (elections were 
held in 1969 and 1 9 7 4) have been successful partly because of the 
use they have made of the opportunities provided for them by 
self-help. This point applies not only to the Kikuya politicians 
of Central province, where " harambee” has taken/ deepest roots, 
but may also be made for most of the rest of Kenya, including those 
areas without a significant history of involvement in the independence
struggle. Thus, at the local level, it is accurate to asse2^  that/
party politics is ’’dead" but quite wrong to take the view that
I #
politics is wholly absent from the scenc^ in fact, the self-help 
movement has provided the focal point for some very lively politicking 
indeed. For the most part, the involvement of politicians in 
self-help takes the form of giving donations to projects. It rarely 
involves any regular organisational activity]; relatively few MPs have 
a record of member ship on a significant number of self-help committees. 
By donating to projects politicians seem to have at least two 
objectives inview* One is simply to obtain support by the-act of 
donation itself. The other, ‘and perhaps the more important, is that
the meetings, at which the donations are given, provide an opportnity
jfor them to make speeches which they might not otherwise be permitted
to make. District Commissioners have frequently applied their power
cf refusal to allow directly political meetings to be held but are
not usually concerned to stand in the way of what appear to be worthwhile
self-help project me tings. Yet, at the sarnf' time, a r-urri^ C T  of
politicians (the most notable of whom is the jlate J.M. Kariuki) have
1
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used such meetings to make speeches of qui be a cri oicel and radical 
character. It could Yell be that t,he safety valre effect of this 
practice has been appreciated by higher authority, -which, in turn, 
has deliberately allowed it to continue,' Thus, the national leadership, 
whilst.for the most part eschewing the use of KAKU as a party for 
participation, has adopted a largely permissive attitude to self-help.
Research on the•connection between politics and community 
development has been carried at in Kenya, and provides some useful 
sources for amplification of the points being made here. In this 
connection, the work of Lamb, I-lutiso, Godfrey and Tallis may useiully 
be summarised.^ Lamb’s'work was done in Central Province, Mutiso 
and Godfrey’s throughout Kenya and Wallis’s in Rift . valley.
It is unfortunate that relatively little ork has been carried out 
in the Nyanza and Western Provinces where the opposition K.R.U. has 
been strong. As a result, most of the research described here refers 
primarily to areas of K.A.IT,U, hegemony.
Lamb’s fieldwork was carried out in 1 9 6 7? earlier than the
other studies referred to here. Basically, his interests was in
discovering the nature of the political network in one district ,
Murang’a in Central Province. As far as community development is
concerned, his conclusion is that it offers ,rooth a training ground
and a political, arena for locLl political actors, a.nd a potential
" 11constituency of organised support for local politicians."
A particularly interesting section of his study for our purposes 
is concerned with the building of ’’Harambee” (or soTf-help) schools 
in Murang’a ... and particularly in the politically divided area of 
, Kandara. Like many other parts of Central Province, this area has 
been characterised by rivalry between "two KANUS”, often referred 
to colloquially as "KANUA" and KAMJB”, On the one side there was 
the faction led by Taddeo Mwaura, who had been a detdn.ee during the 
1 9 5 0’s but after independence tended to ally himself with the 
"loyalist" or "House Guard" group, which in turn was largely Uncritical 
of Government policy on such issues as land and unemployment. The 
opposing faction was more or lo n under the leadership of Bildad Kaggia
who had been one of President Kcnyatta’s colleagues in prison in
12 ' the 1 9 5 0’s . Kaggia1 s po: i on was, according to iamb’s account,
very different from that of in,aura— " Kaggia’s stand was one which
emphasized the revolutionary eh sents of African nationalism, demanding
- 6~-
firm action against the former loyalists, " In Xandara this 
factional conflict took a particularly sharp form, not surprisingly 
in view of its general reputation as the ’worst’ division in the 
district during the .Emergency,
To a considerable extent, this conflict was reflected in 
the building of self-help schools, many of which were started at 
least partly ( and often mainly) for directly political reasons.
In 1964 and 1965 very many of these schools were built, often without 
the involvement "f .the Community Development Department or the 
approval of the Education Department, Many of the schools ran into 
difficulty through 1 -ck of planning and insufficient funds as a result.
Lamb is convinced that many of these schools were encouraged 
by members of what he calls the Kwaura faction in order to recruit 
support against Kaggia and his followers. For example, most of the 
members of the school committees were influeriial in the Mwaura 
faction. During the Emergency, most of them had been loyalists and 
Home Guards. Kaggia refused to coopera e in the building of these 
schools, although for a time officers in the Provincial i.dminis'trat.ion 
tried to persuade him otherwise. His argument was that self-help 
was a method by which the Government was trying to evade its development 
responsibilities.
By the mid—1910’s the disenchantment of Kaggia and others with
the Government’s policies generally led to the creation of the Kenya
People’s Union under the leadership of Mr, Oginga Odinga, Kaggia
was Odinga’s deputy in the party. The Government’s reaction was to
call what became known as the "little general election", of 19 6 6, In
Kandara, Kaggia, who had been M,P. since independence, was defeated
ISby Hwaura by the handsome -margin of 20,230 to 2,170. v Of course, it
would be wrong to owedelude that this was wholly the result of Mwaura’s
self-help activities. There is little doubt that restrictions were
pGLaoed on Kaggiafs campaign activity, for example. However, the
fact that Mwauxa bad been able t o  build up an effective political
machine, partly through self-help, was no doubt a strong contributory
factor. Following the election, Hwaura attempted to consolidate
bis position through the building of more schools. In Kandara* there 
c  7
is little doubt that the building of self-help schools has been a-
1 1
useful political strategy, even if many of them have suffered from 
chronic planning and financial difficulties* To a. large extent, 
this is a consequence of the high priority accorded to education 
by Kenyans* Even if the building of schools is very difficult, the 
hope that s©nothing worthwhile will eventually materialise seons 
to be enough to attract political support to those who sponsor such 
activities. As a result, Lamb argues, the Mwaura faction of KATIE
iset up a system of political recruitment which assisted considerably 
in the defeat of Kaggia. It is also interesting to note that this
faction reflected very much the ideology of the national leadership*
This was summarised by the D.C., Murang’a , as "work hard, forget 
the pa t and buy land. Thus KA1KLv was able to bolster its position
in Kanaara not through the formal - party structure before 1 9 ^ 5 controlled 
by Kaggia, incidentally) but through self-help groups associated 
with a particular factional leadership. Kaggia’s defeat in 1966 seemed 
to indicate that staying out of self-help was not an effective political 
strategy. Indeed there is evidence that politicians with similar 
•militant1 attitudes learnt this lesson0/ In the I9&9 General 
Election,most constituencies were characterised by rivalry in self-help 
and the ’radicals1 were fully drawn into this process. To adopt 
Kaggia's position had become more o„- less untenable. Finally, there is
little doubt that Lamb’s analysis confirms the view expressed earlierv x
that, by neglecting politics, the textbooks omit a significant 
dimension of Community Development work.
The second study to be analysed here, that of Mutiso, was carried 
out in the Mach-akos district of Eastern Province. It is particularly 
interesting for two reasons First, it explicitly shows a direct link 
between local self-help activity and the political career of a 
Cabinet Minister, hence indicating a clear relationship between 
self-help and national politics. Secondly, his case-study is of 
interest because it suggests something of the role performed by rural, 
women in Kenya politics. Of all the ICenya district, Machakos lias 
a reputation ior being in the forefront of self-help activity. Some 
writers have argued that this is linked with traditional( i.e. pre- 
colonial) patterns of social organisation. 1 '
Mutiso's study, however, centres on what he argues is not
a traditional organisation because it substantially ’undercuts'
i fttraditional relationships. "Mbai Sya Eitu" ( meaning " Clan of girls") 
originated among the to women of the lfjrthern Division of Machakos 
district in 196l. A few years later their activities became less 
geographically confined and their influence was felt throughput"
Machekos and also in the neighbouring Kitui district. This women’s 
organisation, which makes heavy use of symbolism and ritual in its activities 
has been involved in two kinds of related activity. First, it has 
considerable political influence - a fact which was clearly' borne out 
in the 19^3 and 1969 elections. Secondly, it has been a powerful agent
in raising funds for such self-help projects as schools and health centres.
These two activities are ixtorTolotod in that the one clearly strengthens 
the other. The ability of the organisation to initiate ( and often
complete) self-help projects is likely to enhance its political "cloud"
* conyerselv^it has^ widespread^ political support . _ , .m t  is more likely to do dole to extract funds and labour from rural
communities. Mutiso’s account, although not really making this point
I"explicit, seems to confirm this,
I
Much of the discussion of ’Mbai Sya Situ* necessarily centres on 
the political personality of Paul ITgei, now Minister of Local-Government 
in President Kenyatta’s Cabinet. Like Kaggik, ITgei was a colleague 
of President Kenyatta1 s in detention in the 1950,s. As such, he was one
. * J
of the few Mamba politicians to be implicated in the ” Man Man" Movement,
Lake Kaggia's opponents in Kandara, Ngei was quick to realise the uses 
of " harambee" as a political strategy. "Mbai Sya Eitu", the "President" 
of which was his mother, was one of the principal weapons in his armoury,
When he was released from detention in late 196I9 ITgei was faced 
with a dilemma which often faces ex-detainee politicians. Whilst- he, had 
been out of ciruclation, other politicians had emerged and capitalised 
upon Ivgei ’ s absence to build quite strong positions for themselves, In 
Machokos, the main figure who constituted a thread to ITgei in this sense
was Henry Mulli who was recognised as the leader of the more educated and
19 1younger sections of the population, ' Mien Ngei came out of prison, 
he still had considerable popularity in he area !?ut it was nevertheless 
essential for him to deal with the threat posed b Mulli, Mutiso 
characterises ITgei’s strategy thuss—
I
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"Organisationally speaking then Ngei concentrated 
on undercutting Mulli not only as a Ksziba spokesman 
but also by mobilising those who were less educated 
anci bon-Asomi (illiterate) against M u l l i , "20
In order to do this, he formed a "tribal” party, the African 
People's Party ( which was almost entirely Kaaba in Membership) 
in 1962 and worked through the most powerful available "non-asomi" 
organisation," Mbai Sya Situ", which seems to have been formed with 
this political purpose in mind. ITgei's successes in the 1 9 6 3 election 
in the Kangundo constituency(when he stood on an APP ticket against 
Mulli for KATJU) and again in 196£) (when both he and Mulli were KANU
candidates, Kenya then being a one-party state ) are to a large extent 
attributable to the organisational backing he received from "Mbai Sya Eitu, "
Precisely how the organisation perfomrmed this function is not 
entirely clear from Mutiso's analysis, but a rought picture may be derived 
from his paper nonethelless. First, it appears that the "harambee" work 
of tfMbai Sya Eitu", to which Mutiso devoted substantial attention, 
contributed to the political effort. This would have been more the case in 
1969 than in 1963 ( when"harambee" was really only just getting started).
The existence of tangible evidence of successful projects sponsored by 
"Mbai Sye Eitu" ( and thus linked to ITgei) influenced political behaviour. 
A second point is that Ugei, through this women*s'organisation, was able 
to appeal to the resen ment felt by the poorer, less literate sections 
of the population towards the literate- the "asomi". In this connection, 
it is not only i.ronic that Ngei is a University graduate ( Makerere) but 
he has also become quite a wealthy man, largely as a result of the 
advantages given him by virtue of his political position. For is he 
conspicuous for advancing the cause of the poor in Parliament or Cabinet- 
if-anything, it is the ojjposite. Thirdly, the’ political success of 
Fgei, through "Mbai Sya Eitu," may be attributable to the fact that he 
directly solicited the support of a section of the population often neglected 
in Kenya politics until then - the rural women. "Mbai Sya Eitu" became an 
"um.brella" organisation through which their support was obtained. Again, 
however, it is doubtful if Hgei may be regarded as a champion 'of the cause 
of rural women.
Although it is possible th : ' the above account does not really 
do Mutiso’s study justice, like L ml ' 3 work it provides substantiation 
for the main point being argued here- that to separate the analysis of self-
- 9 ~
help from the political system is very artificial and a distortion of
reality. Mutiso makes it clear that "Mbai Sya Situ" is not just
political, it does respond to genuine community needs, and could do
0"1
more with government support. ' This is not in dispute ( although Mutiso 
may "be overstating its" development" potential). What is important is 
that in Machnkos, as in- Murang*a, it is not just the political, party that 
has to he studied in order to understand the nature of local politics. 
Self-help must also he taken into account. Indeed there seems a good 
case for arguing that the latter is tjie more important of the two.
Further evidence of the political nature of self-help in Kenya, is
provided hy the case of the "Haramhee" Colleges of Technology which
mushroomed in many parts of the country in the early 1970's. These were
considerably more ambitious than other types of project which had been
carried out earlier. Part of the justification given for the colleges
was economic and developmental - in that the organisers regarded them as
way of reorienting the educational system in a more technological' direction
and away from the dominant rather bookish approach in the ordinary schools.
It is significant, however, that' the development planners were just about
the only group of remotely influential people who opposed these projects-
on the grounds that the already existing system of polytechnics and
technical colleges was, in fact, underutilised. Although it seems clear
that many Kenyans who took part in fundraising and other activities were
convinced of the economic merits of what they were doing, the evidence
from the work done by Godfrey and Mutiso is indicative of important
political considerations as well. For example, they identify regionalism
("Majimboism") as being one of the motives of the founders of these 
22projects. ~ There has even been talh of converting the colleges into
23"tribal universities." Because not all regions are equally endowed 
with resources ( and, perhaps, organisational cohesiveness) some regions 
have done much better than others. Kiambu and kurangTa Colleges, for 
example, are now in operation whilst the projects‘in many other parts 
of the countrylook tmlikely to see fruition. It is significant that 
the Kiambu and Murang1a Colleges are in the predominantly Kikuyu Central 
Province^ their success is only likely to reinforcie ethnic feeling against 
the inhabitants of that part of Kenya. Thus regionalism seems to breed
further regionalism as the process of cum 'dative nequality makes itself
2/1 •*' felt. ■ . . ‘ V , ' *■
' r ■ 4J
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As well as the regionalism aspect, the colleges of technology
have been a vehicle for personal political ambitions. For example,
in 1974 the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hjoroge Mungai, tried
to start such a College in his constituency of Dagoretti as part of
an (unsuccessful) attempt to bolster his chances of winning the election
25there later in the year* ' Godfrey and kutiso refer to a letter written 
by a politicaian' in defence of this practices-
"Which of the colleges of technology have not
got the leadership or support of politicians.?”
In this sense, at least? the colleges of Technology are well
within an established ”HarambeeM tradition. However, in other ways, they
constitute a significant departure from that tradition."'1 First, because
the scale of these projects is much larger than has been the case with
other types of "Hararabee” activity it has not been possible for then
to be dominated by one leader. This fact has had the consequence, in some
areas, of immobilising the projects all together, Ukamba and Meru being
coses in point. Secondly, the two authors argue " the institutes of
technology campaign represents something entirely new in Kenyan politics,
the return to their areas of ethnic orgin of members of the elite other
28than professional politicians." ' As this point, the discussion becomes 
somewhat confusing since Godfrey and Mutiso refer to these people as 
"non-politicians” but deny that this means they aro”non-political." Indeed, 
the use of the term "non-politician” looks even more suspect when the 
two authors remark thats—
KMP's anxiety about this group has intensified since 1969 
when many members lost their seats to non-noliticians 
who argued that their education and/or bureaucratic 
esperience fitted them for political leadership.”
( my underlining).
This just does not make sense Py definition, MPS cannot be beaten 
in elections by "non-politicians. ” However, if this point is left aside, 
the Colleges of Technology study does indicate another significant 
dimension in the politics of "Harambee”. It appears that these projects 
are a means by which a more duea ted, perhaps more "bureaucratic,” group 
is attempting to develop a political base for itself. One should not take 
this point too far* After all, plenty of project organisers ! did not stand
-  12  -
for election in 1 9 74 and many of them no doubt had a genuinely .'.'disinterested
desire to serve their communities, But* equally? political ambitions
have been fostered through the Institutes. In the 1974 Election campaign
a politician’s contribibtiiion to the Institutes was undoubtedly an
important factor in many areas, ^  And certainly, by 1974? it had become
politically risky to isolate oneself from these projects, Godfrey and
Mutiso report that only two Ministers (out of twenty-one) did not got
31 ‘"formally involved, " One reason for this high level of involvement 
is undoubtedly the fear that their political position night otherwise 
be undermined. The two ministers who did not get involved had a particularly 
tough time in the 19 74 Election,
Thus, the case of the Colleges of Technology seems to offer 
further confirmation of our central thesis that "Harambee", not the 
Party ( or other formal political institutions), is the organisational 
framework for political competition and participation in Kenya, The 
criticisms directed against the Colleges- by development planners, for 
example- may well be valid on one level, i.e. that they do not make
i
economic sense. However, given the constraints within which political
competition occurs in Kenya, they do make a kind of political sense,
32albeio in an often economically wasteful way, <
/
The other piece of research to be reported on here was carried
out by the present author in Kericho district in 1969 at a time when
33a general election campaign was in progress. - An opportunity was thus 
afforded to observe how self-help activity and electoral politics arc 
inter-connected. In Kericho in 1969 there is little doubt •that self- 
help was used as a resource for the cultivation of politicians constituencies. 
An example of. this is the buidiing of secondary schools in the Belgut 
constituency in the west of the district. In 1968 Alfred arap Kerich 
(the sitting M.P. from 1 9 6 3 - 1969 and Assistant Minister for Commerce 
and Industry) organised a Harambee Secondary School Project only two 
miles away from a school which had just been built, by Wesley Rono, a. local 
school teacher. Until this time, Kerich had been‘something of an "absentee" 
M,P, and had not been active in self-help. When lie learnt that H0110 was 
planning to stand against him in the neat electio , whenever it came, 
he felt compelled'to make his own contribution to the building of a 
Harambee s c h o o l  i n  order to safeguai eoto.i/al position. Rono had
/
/1
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in fact decided to make substantial use of "Harambee" as a political 
weapon. In his objective he was successful, defeating Kgrich by 8,016 votes 
to 4 ,4 5 7. It is significant that virtually no attempt was made
by the government to control such undoubtedly wasteful projects, both 
from an economic - and educational point of view. This was not just 
because Kerich was an Assistant Kinintor^fter all, they made no attempt 
to control Rono’s activities either. This lack of control cannot be 
attributed to mere administrative ,neglect. Rather, it seems to have been 
a deliberately permissive policy which was adopted.
Members of the government have been aware of the problems which 
oan result from the Kerich type of activity. This explains the concern 
of Mr. Arap Moi, the Vice-President, when he spoke to the National Community 
Development Committee in Parliaments—
"Mr. Moi said that it was a bad habit for politicians to try to 
please the masses by promising things which will never turn up. He said, 
"This is a very serious problem caused by us politicians."
But, in spite of his criticism^, Mr. Moi was himself heavily involved 
in "Harambee" projects throughout the areas he was trying to control 
politically (which included Kericho) when the Colleges of Technology 
movement started he became a leading figure in the Right Valley Project,
This does not really imply dishonesty on his part. To survive politically, 
he had to get involved in "Harambee" even if this meant a certain amount 
of.economic irrationality.
The election of 1974 also provided significant indications of links 
between electoral politics and self-help. In this connection, mention 
has already "been made of the efforts made by Dr. Mungai in his Dagoretti 
constituency, efforts which, as things turned out, amounted to too little, 
too lain. A particularly interesting case of success in 1974, however, 
was that of Mr Mw&i Kibaki, Minister of Finance and Planning, In his 
ministerial capacity, Kibaki frequently found it necessary to stress the 
need for greater government control over the self--help movement, but in 
his capacity as politician he was often obliged to behave in an opposite 
way. This contradiction was brou, hi out i articularly clearly in the 
1974 election. Kibaki had been the Kin.', ter responsible for the 
publication of two development plana, 1 9 7 0 - 7 4 and 1 9 7 4-7 8 , in both of
1- 14 -
which there is stress on the need for greater control of self-help 
projects. There is no doubt that his Ministry’s policy was that, from 
an economic point of view, it was undesirable for self-help projects 
to be allowed to mushroom without planning controls.
However, as a politician , Kibaki was obliged to see matters quite 
differently. Since independence, he had been M 0F. for the Nairobi con­
stituency of Bahati. In common ^ith most other countries in Kenya the 
early 1970's were characterised by considerable economic difficulty. As 
elsewhere, rising prices and unemployment gave rise to growing social 
discontent, especially in the ur|an areas. Kibaki become the focus 
of much of this discontent in the course of 1973/l974 and c r i t i c i s m -  
of his handling of the economy became strident, both within parliament 
and outside. As Kibaki put it himself in 1975s~
"There is little serious effort to understand economic 
. issues. In Parliament the KPs blame the Treasury, Outside 
everyone blames the Minister, People think the Minister 
of Finance is all powerful and is responsible for everything 
that has to do with the economy,"37
Until the 1970*s, a feature of Kibaki *s career had been his relative 
isolation from the political in-fighting that is common in Kenya . 
politics, However, in 1969 a narrow electoral victory had brought home 
the danger facing him. .And the economic difficulties referred to above 
reinforced for him the feeling that a change in approach was needed.
For one thing, it became clear that his position in Bahati was becoming 
untenable in that, in an open contest, he stood little chance of *. victory 
in the next general election. As a result, Kibaki decided to'go home 
politically, back to the rural constituency of Othaya in Nyeri district.
In building for himself a new political base, involvement in "Harambee" 
played a major part. For instance he became heavily involved in the 
sponsorship of a hospital at the town of Karatinm,a project which had been 
rejected by both the development and physical planners on the grounds
38that there was a large district hospital less than twenty miles away.'
It is notable that Kibaki’s involvement in this project goes back as 
far as 1 9 7 0, an indication of his early awareness of the f difficulty 
facing him in Baliati. But in the course of 197*T the effort reached a 
zenith. By the time the election cos n jjroper commenced in September
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of that year, hardly a day passed without reports of Kibaki having addressed
39on "Harambee" meeting* His activities were to a large extent devoted
40to the conventional self-help projects such as schools. But a large
part of his effort went into a project to provide piped water for a large
number of homes in the area-the Othaya Water Project* Kibaki quickly
established himself as the leading sponsor of this endeavour, the total
r \ 41cost of which was estimated at twelve million shillings (.K). As a
result of Kibaki’s efforts, over one million shillings had been contributed
42for the project by the time of the election. What Kibaki was doing 
probably did not have development planning appro^val, but was undoubtedly 
politically successful. He achieved a landslide victory?—
Table I
Othaya Election Hesuit, 1974*^
1. Mr. Kibaki 14,603
2* M. Mugwixi 820
3* I.Muthua Kega 156
4. J.T. Mwaniki 9 7.
His strategy, in which " Harsynbee” played a.- large part, had paid 
off handsomely Prom 1975 onwards he was in a strong local position for 
perhaps the first time in his career, and his status nationally was 
greatly enhanced as a result. Yet to do this, it had been necessary for 
him to act in a way quite contrary to the policy of the Ministry of which 
he was in charge. Political necessity had once again got the better of 
economic planning criteria*
The Kibaki case is certainly a useful example of the role of "Harambee'1 
in building a political career, but is less significant than the case 
of J.M. Kariuki, usually known as "J.M." Prior to his assassination in 1975; 
he had developed a power base which far transcended his home area, an 
unusuAL phenomenon in Kenya politics, and had largely done this through hisA A
"Harambee'1 activities* H ' Since the banning of the Kenya People’s Union 
in 1 9 6 9? he had also established a reputation as being the leading radical 
critic of government policy—a : cei ion which also contributed to his 
increasing popularity in the 1976)’ a
1
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To understand the role of Kariuki in Kenya politics, it is
necessary to go back to the "Kan Man" period of the 1950's* Kariuki
indentified himself at that time with the revolt and was detained as 
45a result,  ^ After 19639 he was largely associated with such Kikuyu
politicians as Bildad Kaggia, who argued that those who had fought for
p nyfreedom were not gaining thing from independence. In addition, he was 
strongly critical ’of those in government ( or linked with it) who had 
become wealthy as a result of their positions* He argued, for instance,
46that there should be a coiling on land holdings in Kenya. It is odd,
in the circumstances, that he remained in the government for so longf until 
I969 he was Assistant Minister of Agriculture and from 1969-74 he was 
Assistant Minister of Tourism and Tfildlife. After the 1974 elections 
he did not receive a government post, probably because his criticism of 
government had become too great a source of annoyance to Kenya's ruling 
class* His dismisal from office, however, was a bitter perconad. blow 
for Kariuki,
From our point of view what is interesting about.the politics of
Kariuki is the use he made of "Harambee" to boost his jjosition. Although
he was an Assistant Minister, he was nevertheless often refused permission
47to address public meetings. . He was, however, often able, to get 
around this restriction by addressing "Harambee" meetings after making/ p
(often considerable) contributions. There is little evidence that lie
49was banned from addressing such meetings,^
Of course, not all the contributions by Kariuki to self-help projects
are a matter of public record. There are numerous press reports, but it
is probable that they only, scratch the surface* It is safe to conclude
that substantial sums ofmc-ney have been involved* An interview in 1969
suggested that £1,000 per month might be a reasonable estimate, Kariuki
denied this, but not sufficiently strongly as to indicate that this figure
is very wide of the mark, J °  By 1975? it could well have become an under
estimate. The question arises of where the money cane from. In the
interview referred to, he stated that it had come from business, especially
agricultures- • '
"IAm not very wealthy at all. The only thing is
that I have been working very h x We have been
told by IT, Jd, The President to o beck to the land,
I went to the land right from f be* inning. At the
end of 1 9 6 2, when people' started fearing whether it was
good to buy a large scale f"-re., I went there and bought 
a farm,"51
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From there ho wont on to invest in coffee estates, obtained 
royalties from Mad ag Do taj nee, bought more farms, opened a bookshop 
and so on. On this evidence, there is little doubt that he was one of 
the first successful African Business-men in Kenya.
He was, however, prepared to use his wealth to further his political
career and to try to bring about egalitarian change. The genuineness
of his "radicalism "was often questioned. Whether he was genuine or not,
there is little douct that very many Kenyans were convinced that he
was The outcry which followed the announcement of his death seems adequate
5?evidence of this.' His popularity extended to virtually all parts of 
Kenya, With the possible exception of the President himself, Karinki was 
the only Kikuyu politician in a position to make this claim-which is 
probably why he was feared by those in power. Community Development 
undoubtedly contributed to his popularity by providing an organisational 
framework for. the communication of his ideas.
Little mention , has yet been made of president Kenyatta. To omit 
him altogether, however, would be a disservice to the argument which we 
are presenting;here, fc:r it was the President who was responsible for 
popularising the 3logan " Harambee" soon after independence. In his
speeches the 'Harambee' theme is common and are often climaxed by a
chanting of the word. This point is amplified .By his speech on the
occasion of Independence day in 1 9 6 3s— '
"My friends we are now on independent nation, and our 
destiny is henceforward in our own hands. I call on 
every Kenyan to join the today in this great adventure 
of nation building. In the spirit of HARAMBEE, let us all 
work together so to mould our country that it will set an 
example to the world in progress, toleration and. high 
endeavour."53
The speech closed with these words?—
"Now the Government is ours. Maybe you will now be 
blaming Kenyatta, saying ’Kenyatta, we elected you, 
but where is this .or that ? ’ But you must know that Kenyatta 
alone cannot give you everythin All things we must do together. 
You and 1 must work together xo develop our country, to 
get education for our ohiidr- ; to have doctors, tc build 
roads, to improve or provide ■ 11 day-to-day essentials.
This should be our work, in the spirit that I am going
to ask you to echo, to shout aloud, to shatter the foundations r,
of the past with the strength of our new purpose... HARAMBEE >r
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The last passage is particularly helpful in indicating what
Kenyatta has been trying to do with the 1 Harambee1 idea# First, it
is clear that he has seen 'harambee', from the time of independence
onwards, as a tool for development which would not place an undue
burden on governnent expenditure# In regarding matters thus, Kenyatta
is really echoing the view taken by the colonial government in the
1950’s, i.e. that Community Development could be development ’on the
cheap Secondly, there is, of course, the deliberate use of rhetoric
( ’’Shatter the foundations of the past” etc) which was designed to
link perhaps quite a mundane point about economic development with
55the very meaning of independence. In doing this Kenyatta was displaying 
a skill which he had clearly possessed for many years$ after
independence it was possible for it to flower without restriction*
Thirdly, it is clear from this speech that Kenyatta saw 'Harambee’, 
from the very beginning, as a political tool, even as a ideology, which 
could be used to bolster the position of his government. Fifteen years 
after independence, it is possible to regard this strategy as at least 
a partial success. The government has remained in power not merely 
because it has used coercion, but also because the energies of the 
people have been diverted into a variety of ’harambee’ activities#
The President, himself, is the sponsor of a number of major 
’harambee* projects,the best known of wl ;oh are the Gatundu self-help 
hospital , the Ga+undu children's orphanage home, and the Forces 
Memorial Hospital* ( Gatundu is the President's home area and 
constituency)• In addition his wife, Mama Hgina, has also been a 
prominent sponsor of major projects (e.g. Mar.a Ngina's Children's home. 
Mama Hgina Secondary School). In the early days at least, this 
sponsorship of projects was seen as setting an example to the Kenya people
'Harambee1 became something of a bandwagonf virtually all leading
politicians felt they had to follow the President’s example, without, 
of course, outshining the woik of their mentor. These sponsored projects 
were not, however, primarily 'developmental' in nature to view them 
in this way would exclude the role they have played in the politics of
Kenya# The flood of visitors to Kenyatta's ’’court” has become one
56of the principal features of tne country's politics#' Leys describes 
this phenomenon thuss—
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"To the court came delegations of all kinds? 
district, regional, tribal, and'also functional.
Most of them came from particular dis-riots, often 
in huge numbers, accompanied by teams of traditional 
danders and choirs of schoolchildren, organised and
led by the MPs and local councillors, and provincial
and district officers from the area* Tiey gave displays 
of dancing and singings the leaders presented cheques
for various causes sponsored by the President and
expressed their sentiments of loyalty and respects and 
would finally outline various needs and grievances," '
The final sentence of Leys’s account is the most important,
Ey the 1970's a pattern had been established! to see the President, 
if one is from outside the immediate governing circle, it is obligatory 
to bring along a farily substantial donation for some cause or other.
Only in this way is it possible for a group of people to get across
its needs to the President. 'Harambee', then, has become a facilitator
of interest group politics. One month picked out at random may serve
us as an examples- '*
1 , February 2 0, 1974 — Mrs Salie, a Malaysian visitor,
contributed 5*000/— to Gatundu self-help hospital, 3,000/- to 
Gatundu children's orphanage, Kiguno self-help hospital, 1,500/— , 
to the Ethiopian Famine Relief Fund 2 ,0 0 0/—,
2, February 21, 19'/4- The Bishop of Mt Kenya, Rt. Rev. Obadiah Kariuki, 
to Ethiopian famine Relief Fund 1,100/-,
3, February 21,1974 — The Minister for Tourism and Wildlife,
Mr, J.M, Shako, on behalf of "African first shooters"
v
contributed a total of 7?000/- to Gatundu self-help hospital and 
Kiambu Institute of science and technology,
4* February 25, 1974 — Mayor of Embu, Councillor A Githenjl,, on 
behalf of the Jumuiya Baladia Muslim Mission, He contributed 
500/- to each of the followings Gatundu self-help hospitals 
Mama Ngina's Childrens' Homej the Forces Memorial Hospitals 
and North East Province Famine Relief Fund.
5* February 26, 1974 - Leader of Md mio dancers, Mr, Nganga Wangoro, 
contributed 500/- to Gatundu eelf-lielp hospital.
6, February 26, 1974 - Mukuwe Farmers’ Company Ltd
of Limuru contributed l,500/~ each of Gatundu
self-help hospital and Mama Ngina’s Childrens' home and
1,000/- to each of Kiambu Institute of science and technology
58and Ethiopia Famine Relief Fund.
These contributions amount to a form of tribute-a means of showing
59one’s and loyalty to the ruler with the hope of gaining som§ reward.
Often what was being nought was a favourable administrative derision of some 
sort, and it can be assumed that such decisions were often obtained in this 
way. To sum ups the President having set the ''Harambee" bandwagon 
in motion was now using it ds a vehicle to channel personal access to 
himself,
CONCLUSIONS
Essentially? what we are arguing is that Community Development in
Kenya, in the specific form of "Harambee", has Seen of considerable political
importance. Mainly, its contribution has been to . act as a mechanism for
control. It is undeniable that the country is experiencing'a pattern of
growing social differentiation in the sense that Leys describes it in his 
6ostudy. There is the emergence of .. class structure with an economically 
powerful bourgeoisie at the apex and a very complicated "mix" of petty- 
bourgeois, proletarian and peasant elements at the lower levels. Part’ 
ox the appeal of politicians like Kariuki, for example, was that they 
represented the aspirations of these diverse elements. One does not 
wisn to dispute the accuracy of Leys’ account of the political economy of 
Kenya. There is no doubt that he is broadly right about the emergence of 
a class structure under the impact of neo-colonialism. However, it is 
notable that he pays little attention to the phenomenon of "Harambee". As 
a result, one gets little feeling of how the present government maintains 
itself in power, except through coercion and the "ideology of tribalism,"
The omission of "Harambee" from his analysis means the neglect of a vital 
component of the whole process of political control in Kenya,
The uses of "Harambee" for Kenya’s governing class may be spelt out 
in a variety of different, albeit connected, ways. First it may be viewed 
as a form of manipulation of the "people" by those who rule. "Harambee"
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in this sense is linked veith what-John Saul describes an "interested, 
manipulative populism" s—
"For it has been mentioned that a populist vision 
can divert attention from internal contradiction^ 
used consciously, it may thus become a most 
conservative force, even a cynical cover for continuing 
privilege. Growing differentiation either between the 
elite and mass or within the rural community itself, as 
well as subtle compromises with international capital, 
can be masked behind a rhetoric of homogeneity and 
national interest"'^
"Harambee" is clearly populism in this particular sense. It masks
the growing differentiation which Leys quite correctly observes, and
places in its stead the view of the world as expressed by the D.C. in
 ^3Murang’a - "work aard, forget the past and buy land," It also squares
with the rhetoric so often employed by President Kenyatta as, for example,
in the speech on Independence L„y, 19^3? which was quoted earlier. As
an approach to development, it purports to assist the poorj in reality
- . / it has effect of entrenching the tourgeoisee in power, "Harambee" as
"manipulation" could also be well described as a form of false consciousness.
A second, closely connected, use of "Harambee" for the rulers 
is as a means of promoting the "ideology of tribalism", which, in turn, 
makes possible the avoidance of xhe emergence of class consciousness, We 
have cited, in this connection, the "regionalist" implications of the 
"Harambee" Colleges of Technology. Whether consciously manipulated or not , 
this particular lore of "Harambee" has certainly had the effect of diverting 
peole’s political energies and spirit to their regions of origin. As 
projects in, say, central Province, reach fruition so it becomes necessary 
that Western and Kyanza Provinces are not left behind, A spirit of regional 
competition is..induced and.this is very helpful for purposes of political 
control*- This analysis can be taken further, to the village (or sublocational) 
level where,the spirit of competition is foundf here, too, political
energies are successfully diverted from a class view of Kenya politics,
i)
Another sense in which self-help in Kenya works as a mechanism of 
control is through cooptation. By drawing " \  cal leaders" into the 
frame wo.re: of policy-making tnc hop o has been hat some clor.ents
6 4of discontent may thus be siphoned off. This point docs not only 
apply to self-help# In Kenya, there are various kinds of groups and 
committees which fulfil a similarly cooptative function, e.g. cooperatives 
and tea committees ( for smallholder tea producers). Cooptation also 
supplies a safety-valve effect5 it enables resentment to be released in a 
way which the government can nevertheless keep under reasonable control.
It is clear, for example, that the building of schools in Kandara ( as 
discussed by Lamb) may be partly viewed in this light, as may be the 
numerous similar activities taking place in the rest of Kenya.
Self-help has also served to offer a "space" in which politicians
hostile to government policy may operate, even if in a restricted manner,
J.M, Kariuki was a useful case in point. Unable to express his ideas 
*
through such formal political mechanisms as the party, he was nevertheless
able to do so at "Harambee’1 meetings, and in the process build a considerable
65'political base for himself, ' But it should be noted that his case also 
reveals the limitations of this strategy. Once it became clear he had
xuDcysxxDS^ T5xx2LX3dP£a^ Tu u^scls^ x^^ exxk:ed established such a base, stronger action
was required against him. So "Harambee" does provide 1 imited opportunities
for politicians critical of government, including those of radical 
66persuasion.
Enough has been said to establish that the conventional, largely 
bureaucratic, view of 'politicians as "meddlers" in self-help is not very 
helpful. It should also be clear by now that the omission of politicians 
from the textbooks on "CD" is misleading. Community Development in Kenya 
is, in fact, a matter of considerable political importance and a means by 
which the government seeks to maintain control of society in which class 
divisions have become pronounced,, It ‘ largely does this by substituting 
other kinds of local, or"ethnic" consciousness for class sentiments.
Whether "Harambee" will retain its hegemony as a dominant organising 
ideology in Kenya remains to be seen. But the task of those who would 
replace it with an alternative, more class based, approach is certainly an 
uphill one. However faj* the process of cl ss differentiation may have gone 
the emergence of real class conflict, involving the peasantry on any large 
scale, appoafs remote. There will be contined discontent . but, partly 
through coercion and partly through ideolo y, it is likely to remain 
fragmented and muted in its impact.
1
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